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Abstract
The argument is re-examined that the program of deriving the rule of state
reduction from the Schro¨dinger equation holding for the object-apparatus
composite system falls into a vicious circle or an infinite regress called the
von Neumann chain. It is shown that this argument suffers from a serious
physical inconsistency concerning the causality between the reading of the
outcome and the state reduction. A consistent argument which accomplishes
the above program without falling into the circular argument is presented.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum mechanics includes a dualism concerning the principle of state change. The
Schro¨dinger equation, on the one hand, governs the state change caused by time evolution.
The rule of state reduction, on the other hand, governs the state change caused by measure-
ment. The dualism is justified as long as the state change of only one system is concerned.
The Schro¨dinger equation holds true only when the system is isolated, but every measure-
ment accompanies the interaction with the measuring apparatus so that the rule of state
reduction holds true only when the system is not isolated. The dualism is therefore justified
[1, p. 420].
Accepting that every measurement accompanies the interaction between the object and
the apparatus at all, one can expect that the rule of state reduction can be derived from
the Schro¨dinger equation holding for the composite system of the object and the apparatus
during the measurement. A negative view, however, prevails against this program. Accord-
ing to that view, the Schro¨dinger equation for the composite system transforms the problem
of a measurement on the object to the problem of an observation on the apparatus, but in
order to derive the rule of state reduction holding for the object one still needs the rule of
state reduction applied to the composite system [2, p. 329]. This implies that the program
of deriving the rule of state reduction from the Schro¨dinger equation holding for the object-
apparatus composite system falls into a vicious circle sometimes called von Neumann’s chain
[3, Section 11.2].
The purpose of this paper is to show that the above argument, usually called the orthodox
view of measurement theory, includes a serious physical inconsistency and then to present a
consistent argument which derives the rule of state reduction from the Schro¨dinger equation
of the composite system without falling into the vicious circle.
In this paper, we are confined to the state reduction caused by a measurement of an
observable with nondegenerate purely discrete spectrum satisfying the repeatability hypoth-
esis. Sections II–VII review with elaboration the most basic part of measurement theory
originated with von Neumann [1]. Section II presents postulates for quantum mechanics
and defines state reduction. Section III introduces the notion of nonselective measurement
and shows that a nonselective measurement causes a state change in quantum mechanics
whereas it is not the case in classical mechanics. Section IV concludes the existence of an
interaction between the measured object and the apparatus in every measurement. Section
V shows that the rule of state reduction is equivalent to the repeatability hypothesis. Sec-
tion VI introduces the projection postulate as the rule of state reduction in the case where
the observable has degenerate spectrum. Section VII derives a necessary condition for a
unitary operator to represent the measuring interaction. The condition determines the form
of the unitary operator representing the measuring interaction leading to state reduction.
The problem is then formulated as whether the unitary operator of this form is sufficient
for deriving the rule of state reduction. Section VIII reviews the orthodox view along with
Wigner’s argument [2] that claims that the unitary operator does not lead to the rule of state
reduction without appealing to the rule of state reduction, the projection postulate, for the
measurement of the pointer position. Section IX shows that the orthodox view suffers from
a serious physical inconsistency concerning the causality between the reading of the out-
come and the state reduction. Section X presents a consistent argument which derives the
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rule of state reduction from the Schro¨dinger equation holding for the object-apparatus com-
posite system without appealing to the projection postulate for the pointer-measurement.
Concluding remarks are provided in Section XI.
II. POSTULATES FOR QUANTUM MECHANICS
In this paper, all state vectors are supposed to be normalized, and mixed states are
represented by density operators, i.e., positive operators with unit trace. Let A be an
observable with a nondegenerate purely discrete spectrum. Let φ1, φ2, . . . be a complete
orthonormal sequence of eigenvectors of A and a1, a2, . . . the corresponding eigenvalues; by
assumption, all different from each other.
According to the standard formulation of quantum mechanics, on the result of a mea-
surement of the observable A the following postulates are posed:
(A1) If the system is in the state ψ at the time of measurement, the eigenvalue an is
obtained as the outcome of measurement with the probability |〈φn|ψ〉|
2.
(A2) If the outcome of measurement is the eigenvalue an, the system is left in the corre-
sponding eigenstate φn at the time just after measurement.
The postulate (A1) is called the statistical formula, and (A2) the measurement axiom.
The state change ψ 7→ φn described by the measurement axiom is called the state reduction.
III. ORIGIN OF MEASUREMENT THEORY
The state reduction can be thought to be caused by the following two factors: the
dynamical change of the system and the change of the observer’s knowledge. In order to
separate these factors, let us suppose that we terminate the procedure of measurement of
the observable A just before the observer’s reading of the outcome; this procedure is called
a nonselective measurement. It follows from postulates (A1) and (A2) that the nonselective
measurement leaves the system in the mixture of the states |φn〉〈φn| with the probability
|〈φn|ψ〉|
2 and therefore yields the following state change:
|ψ〉〈ψ| 7→
∑
n
|〈φn|ψ〉|
2 |φn〉〈φn|. (3.1)
Since a nonselective measurement does not change the observer’s knowledge, this state
change is considered to be caused entirely by the dynamical factor.
Even in classical mechanics, when the outcome of measurement is obtained, the infor-
mation on the outcome changes the observer’s knowledge and the probabilistic description
of the state of the system changes according to the Bayes principle, which is formulated
as follows: Let X, Y be two (discrete) random variables. Suppose that we know the joint
probability distribution Pr{X = x, Y = y}. Then, the prior distribution of X is defined as
the marginal distribution of X , i.e.,
Pr{X = x} =
∑
y
Pr{X = x, Y = y}. (3.2)
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If one measures Y , the information “Y = y” changes the probability distribution of X for
any outcome y. The posterior distribution of X is defined as the conditional probability
distribution of X given Y = y, i.e.,
Pr{X = x|Y = y} =
Pr{X = x, Y = y}
∑
x Pr{X = x, Y = y}
. (3.3)
This principle of changing the probability distribution from the prior distribution to the
posterior distribution is called the Bayes principle.
Nonetheless, a nonselective measurement in classical mechanics causes no change in the
system. Therefore, it is a characteristic feature of quantum mechanics that a nonselec-
tive measurement changes the system dynamically, and it is the origin of von Neumann’s
measurement theory to explain this change.
IV. EXISTENCE OF MEASURING INTERACTION
In quantum mechanics the state of an isolated system changes dynamically according to
the Schro¨dinger equation, but this state change does not change the entropy of the system.
On the other hand, the state change (3.1) caused by the nonselective measurement increases
the entropy of the measured system, and hence this process of state change cannot be
described by the Schro¨dinger equation of the measured system [1, p. 388]. It follows that this
dynamical change of state must be caused by the interaction between the measured object
and the measuring apparatus, a system external to the measured object including every
system interacting with the measured object. Thus, from the basic postulates of quantum
mechanics we have derived the existence of measuring interaction, which is neglected in
classical mechanics. Since our discussion concerns only nonselective measurements, we do
not need to mention the function of consciousness, although the conventional argument
mentions the psycho-physical parallelism [1, pp. 418–420].
V. REPEATABILITY HYPOTHESIS AND STATE REDUCTION
In the measurement axiom (A2), state reduction is described as a change of the state of
the object. In order to consider state reduction together with the interaction between the
object and the apparatus, it is desirable to describe it independently of particular descrip-
tions of states of systems. As one of such descriptions, von Neumann showed that (A2) is
equivalent to the following repeatability hypothesis [1, pp. 213–218, 335]:
(M) If a physical quantity is measured twice in succession in a system, then we get the
same value each time.
In fact, according to (M) the state of the object just after the first measurement is the
eigenstate corresponding to the outcome, and in the nondegenerate case it is determined
uniquely so that we have (A2). It is obvious that (M) follows from (A2).
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VI. PROJECTION POSTULATE
In this paper, we are devoted to measurements of observables with nondegenerate discrete
spectrum. In the conventional discussion explaining state reduction, however, we need
to consider a measurement on the object-apparatus composite system and we need the
statistical formula and the measurement axiom for observables with degenerate spectrum.
The statistical formula for the discrete observable X =
∑
n anEn to be measured in the state
(density operator) ρ is given as follows:
(B1) The eigenvalue an is obtained as the outcome with the probability Tr[Enρ].
In the degenerate case, the eigenstate corresponding to an eigenvalue is not determined
uniquely, and hence (A2) is ambiguous. Moreover, the repeatability hypothesis (M) implies
that the object is left in an eigenstate corresponding to the outcome, but (M) does not
determine the eigenstate in which the object is left. For determining this eigenstate, von
Neumann posed no special principle [1, p. 348], but later Lu¨ders proposed a principle which
has been widely accepted [4]. According to his principle, if the measurement of the discrete
observable X with spectral decomposition X =
∑
n anEn is carried out in the state (density
operator) ρ and leads to the outcome an, then:
(B2) At the time just after measurement, the object is left in the state EnρEn/Tr[Enρ].
This principle is called the projection postulate, because the eigenstate φn provoked by
the measurement is chosen by the projection En onto the corresponding eigenspace so that
φn = Enψ/‖Enψ‖ for the initial state ψ. It is clear that statements (B1) and (B2) imply (A1)
and (A2) as special cases. It follows from (B1) and (B2) that the nonselective measurement
of X leads to the state change such as
ρ 7→
∑
n
EnρEn. (6.1)
VII. INTERACTION BETWEEN THE OBJECT AND THE APPARATUS
We shall turn to the discussion on the measurement of the discrete observable A =∑
n an|φn〉〈φn| with nondegenerate eigenvalues. In section IV, we have concluded that the
state change (1) in the nonselective measurement must be caused by the interaction between
the object and the apparatus. Then, what is this interaction?
Let us suppose that the object is in the eigenstate φn of the observable A pertaining to the
eigenvalue an. By the statistical formula, the outcome is an with probability one. Hence, the
measurement changes the position of the pointer in the apparatus from the original position
to the position an on the scale.
Let B be the observable corresponding to the position of the pointer in the apparatus,
and ξ the original state of the apparatus. Generally it is only required [1, p. 439] that the
eigenvalues {bn} of B are in one-to-one correspondence with the eigenvalues {an} of A, but
we assume for simplicity that the observable B has also the same eigenvalues, a1, a2, . . ., as A.
In the Hilbert space of the composite system of the object and the apparatus, the observables
A and B are represented by the self-adjoint operators A⊗ 1 and 1⊗ B respectively.
The state change due to the interaction is represented by a unitary operator U on the
Hilbert space of the composite system:
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U : φn ⊗ ξ 7→ U(φn ⊗ ξ). (7.1)
According to the statistical formula (A1), the state U(φn⊗ ξ) after the interaction must
be the eigenstate of 1⊗B pertaining to the eigenvalue an. In fact, the position of the pointer
takes the value an with probability one after the interaction, and this implies that the state
U(φn ⊗ ξ) is the eigenvector of 1⊗B pertaining to the eigenvalue an.
On the other hand, according to the repeatability hypothesis (M) the state U(φn ⊗ ξ)
is the eigenvector of A⊗ 1 pertaining to the eigenvalue an. In fact, if the observer were to
measure A in this state again, then the observable A would be measured twice in succession
and hence the outcome would be an with probability one. This implies that the state
U(φn ⊗ ξ) is the eigenstate of A⊗ 1 pertaining to the eigenvalue an.
Suppose here that the eigenvalues of B are also nondegenerate. Then the state that
satisfies the above two conditions is represented by the state vector φn ⊗ ξn, where ξn is
an arbitrary eigenvector of B with unit length pertaining to the eigenvalue an. In order to
represent the measurement the unitary U must satisfy the following relation
U(φn ⊗ ξ) = φn ⊗ ξn. (7.2)
If the unitary operator U satisfies the above condition, then for the arbitrarily given
original state ψ =
∑
n cnφn we have by linearity
U(ψ ⊗ ξ) =
∑
n
cnφn ⊗ ξn. (7.3)
Thus the problem is whether equation (7.3) is a sufficient condition for the unitary operator
U to represent the measuring interaction or whether, in other words, equation (7.3) implies
(A1) and (A2) even when ψ is a superposition of the eigenstates φn. If equation (7.3) were
not a sufficient condition, further interaction — though ineffective in the case where the
object is initially in the eigenstate — might be necessary for the explanation leading to the
state reduction.
VIII. THE ORTHODOX VIEW
The conventional approach adopted by most of the text books on measurement theory,
the so-called orthodox view, is negative about the above problem. The orthodox view holds
that (7.3) does not imply the measurement axiom (A2). The argument runs as follows.
The state transformation by the unitary U ,
(
∑
n
cnφn)⊗ ξ 7→
∑
n
cnφn ⊗ ξn, (8.1)
makes a one-to-one correspondence between the state of the object and the state of the
apparatus. The state of the object is mirrored by the state of the apparatus, and the
problem of a measurement on the object is transformed into the problem of an observation
on the apparatus [2]. If the observer observes the pointer position of the apparatus to obtain
the outcome of measurement, the state in the right-hand side of (8.1) changes as follows:
6
|
∑
n
cnφn ⊗ ξn〉〈
∑
n
cnφn ⊗ ξn|
7→
∑
n
|cn|
2|φn ⊗ ξn〉〈φn ⊗ ξn|. (8.2)
The state change in (8.2) is derived by the projection postulate (B2) applied to the state
change caused by the measurement of the observable 1 ⊗ B of the composite system. Ac-
cording to the projection postulate (B2), the new state is the mixture of the states φn⊗ ξn,
and hence when the outcome an is obtained, a system in the state φn ⊗ ξn is selected from
the ensemble described by the right-hand side of (8.2):
∑
n
|cn|
2|φn ⊗ ξn〉〈φn ⊗ ξn| 7→ |φn ⊗ ξn〉〈φn ⊗ ξn|. (8.3)
Finally, the composite system is in the state φn ⊗ ξn, and this implies that the object is led
to the state φn.
Nevertheless, if we describe further the measuring process which leads to the state change
(8.2) in terms of the coupling with the second apparatus, having an orthonormal system {ξ′n}
and being prepared in a state ξ′, measuring the pointer position in the first apparatus, then
instead of (8.2) we have the following state change:
(
∑
n
cnφn ⊗ ξn)⊗ ξ
′ 7→
∑
n
cnφn ⊗ ξn ⊗ ξ
′
n. (8.4)
From this state change, we cannot conclude that the measurement leads the object with the
outcome an to the state φn. The original problem of explaining the state reduction caused
by the first apparatus is not solved but only transferred to the the problem of explaining
the state reduction caused by the second apparatus [3, Section 11.2]. This vicious circle is
often called von Neumann’s chain.
IX. INCONSISTENCY OF THE ORTHODOX VIEW
A difficulty in the orthodox view is to apply the projection postulate to the object-
apparatus composite system in order to show that the state of the object that leads to the
outcome an is in the state φn at the time just after measurement. This argument suffers
from the circular argument that assumes the rule of state reduction for the composite system
in order to explain the rule of state reduction for the object. The conventional studies of
measurement theory, however, have not detected any physical inconsistency or empirical
inadequacy of the above argument in the orthodox view and have aimed at circumventing the
above circular argument, an epistemological difficulty, by adding, for instance, the element
of macroscopic nature of the measuring apparatus [5,6].
In fact, the above argument leading to the state reduction has been generalized to the
following argument for any measurements to determine the state change caused by measure-
ment conditional upon the outcome: Let us given the initial state ρ of the object, the initial
state of the apparatus σ, and the unitary evolution operator U of the object-plus-apparatus.
Then, compute the state of the composite system just after the interaction as U(ρ ⊗ σ)U †
and apply the projection postulate to the measurement of the pointer observable B in the
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apparatus, and the state ρan just after the measurement conditional upon the outcome an
is given by
ρan =
TrA[(I ⊗ E
B(an))U(ρ⊗ σ)U
†(I ⊗ EB(an))]
Tr[(I ⊗EB(an))U(ρ⊗ σ)U †(I ⊗EB(an))]
, (9.1)
where EB(an) is the projection operator onto the eigenspace of B corresponding to the
eigenvalue an and TrA stands for the partial trace over the Hilbert space of the apparatus.
This unitary-evolution-plus-projection-postulate argument has been a standard argument
for determining the general state reduction, see for example [7–11].
The purpose of this section is, despite the conventional arguments, to show that the
orthodox view suffers from a serious physical inconsistency concerning the causality between
the reading of the outcome and the state reduction.
In order to explain the rule of state reduction in terms of the time evolution of the
object-plus-apparatus, it is necessary to clarify the meanings of the words the “time of
measurement” and the “time just after measurement” in the context as to what happens
in the object and the apparatus. Let us suppose that one measures an observable A =∑
n an|φn〉〈φn| of the object in the state ψ at the time t. The measurement, carried out by
an interaction with the apparatus, takes finite time ∆t > 0. Thus, the object interacts with
the apparatus from the time t to t+∆t and is free from the apparatus after the time t+∆t.
It follows that the time of measurement is the time t, the time just after measurement is
t + ∆t, and that the object is in the state ψ at the time of measurement. The statistical
formula (A1) means, in this case, that the observer obtains the outcome an with probability
|〈φn|ψ〉|
2. The measurement axiom (A2) means that the object that leads to the outcome
an is in the state φn at the time t+∆t. Moreover, the repeatability hypothesis (M) means
that if the observable A is measured at the time t1 = t +∆t again in the same object then
the outcome coincides with the one obtained by the measurement of A at the time t.
In the orthodox view, the state changes given by (8.1) and (8.2) represent dynamical
changes of the system, and the state change (8.3) represents a change of the knowledge
of the observer. The state change (8.1) represents the interaction between the object and
the apparatus. The state change (8.2) represents the interaction between the “apparatus”
and the “apparatus measuring the apparatus”. It follows that the state change (8.1) shows
that the object-plus-apparatus is in the state (
∑
n cnφn) ⊗ ξ at the time t and in the state∑
n cnφn ⊗ ξn at the time t +∆t.
Suppose that the state change (8.2) takes time τ . Then, it is at the time t+∆t+ τ that
the object-plus-apparatus turns to be in the state described by the right-hand side of (8.2).
Since the state change (8.3) represents the change of the observer’s knowledge, it does not
accompany the change of time so that at the time t +∆t + τ the object turns to be in the
state φn as the result of the state reduction. In other words, the orthodox view leads to the
conclusion that the state reduction occurs at the time t + ∆t + τ which is later in time τ
than the time t + ∆t just after measurement. Thus, if τ is not negligible in the time scale
of the time evolution of the object then this contradicts the measurement axiom that the
state reduction leaves the system in the state φn at the time t +∆t.
Since the object is free from the apparatus after the time t1 = t+∆t, one can make the
object interact with the second apparatus at the time t1. If this apparatus also measures
A, according to the repeatability hypothesis it is predicted, and will be confirmed by ex-
periments, that the outcome from the first apparatus and the outcome from the second are
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always the same. But, this fact cannot be explained by the orthodox view which concludes
that the state reduction occurs at the time t1 + τ .
Is τ negligible in the time scale of the time evolution of the object? In general, the
process of the state change (8.2) is regarded as a process in which a macroscopic instrument
operates or a directly-sensible variable feature is produced — otherwise, the state change
in the apparatus measurement might not necessarily satisfy the repeatability hypothesis —
and hence the duration τ of this process cannot be negligible in the time scale of the time
evolution of the microscopic measured object.
Consider, for instance, the experiment in which the light is scattered by an atom in a low
intensity atom beam. Regarding the paths before the collision as known, the measurement
of the path of the photon after the collision suffices to determine the point of scattering. In
order to measure the position of the atom (at the time of collision) twice in succession in
this method, suppose to use two nearly placed light beams I and II; see FIG. 1. Suppose
that the atom interacts with the beam I from the time t to t′ and with the beam II from t1
to t′
1
and that t1 − t
′ is so small that the time evolution of the atom in this period can be
neglected — hence, we can put t1 = t
′. Suppose that the photon scattered from the beam
I is detected by a photoelectric detector at the time t′′, and the one from the beam II is
detected by another photoelectric detector at the time t′′
1
. In this experiment, the collision
is accomplished in quite a short time and the photoelectric detectors are necessary to place
sufficiently far from the light beams, so that it is taken for granted in scattering theory [12,
p. 375] that
t′ − t≪ t′′ − t′. (9.2)
It is taken for granted from the Compton-Simons experiment that there is the uncertainty
of the position at which the beam I is scattered depending on the initial state of the atom
but that the position of the scattering from the beam II is always near the position of the
scattering from the beam I. It follows that this experiment can be considered as the position
measurement of the atom satisfying the repeatability hypothesis [1, pp. 212–214]. In this
example, the state change (8.1) corresponds to the interaction between the atom and the
light beam, and hence we have ∆t = t′ − t. On the other hand, the apparatus corresponds
to the scattered photon, the state change (8.2) corresponds to the process including the free
propagation of the photon after scattering and the interaction between the photon and the
photoelectric detector, and hence we have τ = t′′ − t′. Thus, from (9.2) we have
∆t≪ τ, (9.3)
and consequently we cannot neglect τ . This means that the orthodox view claims that the
state reduction of the atom occurs after the photon is detected despite the fact that the
state reduction of the atom occurs just after the scattering of the light.
The inconsistency of the orthodox view is in the claim of causality between the reading
of the outcome and the state reduction such that the state change (8.2) of the composite
system causes the state reduction of the object system. It is obvious, however, that such
causality does not exists, since the result, the state reduction, occurs before the cause, the
reading of the outcome or the manifestation of the directly-sensible variable feature. It is not
the case that the observer’s knowing or reading of the outcome at the time t′′ = t+∆t+ τ
causes the state reduction of the object at the time t′ = t + ∆t. But, it is the case that
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by knowing or reading of the outcome at the time t′′ the observer obtains the information
to determine the state of the object at the time t′. The orthodox view confuses the time
at which the outcome of measurement is obtained and the time at which the object is left
in the state determined by the outcome. Or, in other words, it confuses the time just after
the reading of the outcome and the time just after the interaction between the object and
the apparatus. There is no causality relation between the outcome and the state just after
measurement but there is coincidence between them yielded by the measuring interaction.
X. NEW INTERPRETATION
Our new interpretation presented in the following does not includes the inconsistency of
the orthodox view discussed in the previous section. Moreover, the state reduction can be
explained only from (8.1) without assuming the process (8.2) so that the circular argument
of the von Neumann chain is circumvented.
As in the preceding section, suppose that the observer measures the observable A =∑
n an|φn〉〈φn| of the object in the state ψ at the time t. The object interacts with the
apparatus from the time t to t + ∆t and is free from the apparatus after the time t + ∆t.
The repeatability hypothesis (M) means that if the observer measures A at the time t1 =
t+∆t again then the outcome coincides with the outcome of the measurement at the time
t. As shown previously, the measurement axiom (A2) is equivalent to the repeatability
hypothesis (M). Hence, if the statistical formula (A1) and the repeatability hypothesis (M)
is derived from (7.3), it is demonstrated that the state reduction is derived from (7.3). Let
Pr{B(t+∆t) = an} be the probability of obtaining the outcome an when the pointer position
B =
∑
n an|ξn〉〈ξn| is measured at the time t+∆t. By (7.3) and the statistical formula (B1)
for the degenerate observable 1⊗ B we have
Pr{B(t+∆t) = an}
= 〈
∑
k
ckφk ⊗ ξk|(1⊗ |ξn〉〈ξn|)|
∑
k
ckφk ⊗ ξk〉
= |cn|
2.
Let Pr{A(t) = an} be the probability that the measurement of A at the time t leads to the
outcome an. Since this outcome is obtained as the outcome of the measurement of B at the
time t +∆t, we have
Pr{A(t) = an} = Pr{B(t+∆t) = an} = |cn|
2. (10.1)
Thus if we regard this process as the measurement of A — namely, if we interpret the
outcome of the measurement of B at the time t + ∆t as the outcome of the measurement
of A at the time t — then it is shown that this measurement satisfies the the statistical
formula (A1).
We shall show that this measurement satisfies the measurement axiom (A2) in the fol-
lowing. Since the measurement axiom (A2) is equivalent to the repeatability hypothesis
(M), we need only to show that this measurement satisfies the repeatability hypothesis (M).
In order to show the last statement, it suffices to show that if the observer measures A
again at the time t1 = t + ∆t, immediately after the first measurement, then the outcome
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of the first measurement at the time t and that of the second at the time t1 are always the
same. Let Pr{A(t) = an, A(t1) = am} be the joint probability that the first outcome is an
and the second outcome is am.
The outcome of the first measurement of A at the time t is the same as the outcome of
the measurement of the pointer position B at the time t1 = t+∆t. Since the measurements
of B and A at the time t1 does not interferes each other, the joint probability distribution of
the outcomes of these two measurements satisfies the statistical formula for the simultaneous
measurements:
Pr{B(t1) = an, A(t1) = am}
= |〈φm ⊗ ξn|
∑
k
ckφk ⊗ ξk〉|
2
= δm,n|cn|
2.
Thus if m 6= n then we have
Pr{A(t) = an, A(t1) = am}
= Pr{B(t1) = an, A(t1) = am}
= 0.
It follows that the outcome of the first measurement and that of the second are always the
same. Therefore, this process satisfies the repeatability hypothesis (M) and hence satisfies
the measurement axiom (A2).
We have thus demonstrated that the unitary operator U satisfying (7.3) represents the
interaction between the object and the apparatus and leads to the state reduction in the
object at the time just after measurement.
XI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It follows from the basic postulate requiring the state reduction that even in the case
where the observer obtains no information from the measurement, namely the case of non-
selective measurement, the state of the system changes. This change is not accompanied
with the change of knowledge so that it is purely dynamical, but it is irreversible so that it
cannot be described by the Schro¨dinger equation of the object. The only way to explain this
by the rules of quantum mechanics is to derive this change from the Schro¨dinger equation
of a larger system than the object, which describes the interaction between the object and
the apparatus. This interaction is turned on during a finite time interval, from the time
t of measurement to the time t + ∆t just after measurement. After the object-apparatus
interaction, the object turns to be free from the apparatus again. Thus, the state reduction
describes the state change from the time t to the time t+∆t conditional upon the outcome
of measurement.
The state change in the nonselective measurement is derived without any difficulties
from the interaction between the object and the apparatus. In fact, the state change (3.1)
is explained as the open system dynamics of the object yielded by the unitary evolution of
the object-apparatus composite system described by the unitary U in (7.3), i.e.,
11
∑n
|〈φn|ψ〉|
2 |φn〉〈φn| = TrA[U |ψ ⊗ ξ〉〈ψ ⊗ ξ|U
†], (11.1)
where TrA is the partial trace over the Hilbert space of the apparatus [13, p. 136]. The prob-
lem is to explain the change of state dependent on the outcome, namely the state reduction.
The answer of the orthodox view to this problem is that the state reduction of the object is
resulted from the state reduction of the object-plus-apparatus caused by the measurement of
the pointer position carried out after the object-apparatus interaction. Applying the above
argument that state reduction needs the time for the nonselective measurement to the mea-
surement of the pointer position, it is concluded that the state reduction, explained by the
orthodox view, occurs apparently later than the time t + ∆t at which the state reduction
should occur. This time difference leads to the detectable difference as to whether the out-
comes obtained by measuring the same object twice in succession satisfy the repeatability
hypothesis, and hence we can conclude that the inconsistency of the the orthodox view can
be tested by an experiment.
The photon scattering experiment from the atom beam in an atom interferometer has
been realized already by Chapman et al. [14]. The double scattering gedanken experiment
suggested in Section IX will be realized in future along with a similar experimental setting
with the additional second laser beam for the repeated measurement of the point of scattering
of a single atom, if a conceivable difficulty can be circumvented in distinguishing the case
where two detected photons from the two beams have been scattered by a single atom from
the other cases.
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FIGURES
FIG. 1. Repeated position measurements by photon scattering from an atom.
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